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JUIISDICTION OVER CRIMLES
I
THE TERRITORIAL COMMISSION THEORY
ALBERT LEvITT*

The criminal law is that portion of the legal ordering of society
which deals with offenses against the state. A criminal activity is one
which injures the state, is proceded against by the state, and the punishment for which cannot be avoided without the consent of the state.'
The function of the criminal law is to protect organized society,
the individuals who compose it, 2 and the institutions which have been
created for their organization and control.3
The criminal law has three distinct sections, substantive, procedural
and therapeutic. The substantive part deals with the types of conduct
which organized society has forbidden as inimical to its welfare. The
procedural part deals with the apprehension of an alleged offender and
the determination of his guilt or innocence. The therapeutic part
deals with the treatment of the offender whose guilt has been determined.4 The principles and theories of jurisdiction over criminal
offenses form part of procedural criminal law.
ELEMENTS OF A CRIMINAL OFFENSE

Criminal offenses are composed of many elements and differ from
each other in varying ways. Some, like the larcenies and homicides,
are closely akin. Others, like champerty and abortion are quite dissimilar. Certain elements, however, are common to them all. These
are of importance in a study of jurisdiction over criminal offenses
because the courts will inquire into some or all of them before they
will assume or reject jurisdiction over a particular offense.
1. The first common element is that there can be no criminal
offense without an offender. He must be legally capable of committing
*Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University Law School, Lexing-

ton, Va.
1R. R. Cherry, "Growth of the Criminal Law in Ancient Communities," p.
2; Cf.
2 Stephen, "History of the Criminal Law," Vol. 1, pp. 2-4.
See Levitt, "Some Societal Aspects of the Criminal Law," 13 Journal of
Criminal
Law and Criminology 90.
3
Pound, "The Future of the Criminal Law," 21 Columbia Law Rev. 1.
4
Levitt, "Some Societal Aspects of the Criminal Law" supra, note 2. See
also "Report of the Cleveland Crime Survey, 1922."
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the offense. He must be of sound mind, have reached an age when
he may be presumed to have attained to discretion and understanding,
and must not be within a relation or status which negatives criminal
capacity.5 He must, also; have the mental attitude toward the thing
done, the consequences produced, or the victim of his activities, which
the criminial law considers culpable.,
2. The second common element is that the offender must have
done that which he was under a duty not to do, or failed to do that
which he was under a duty to do. He must have been guilty of a for7
bidden act or omission.
3. The third common element is that the act or omission must
have had injurious consequences. 8 The function of the criminal law,
inter alia, is to shield society from harmful consequences of human
activities. Not that the criminal law is concerned, in a given prosecution, with attempting to ascertain and nullify all the consequences of
the offender's activities, but that the criminal law does deal, in a specific prosecution, with those consequences which stretch between the
offender's specific illegal acts and the victim's definite injury. Most
offenses are really consequential offenses and many states will punish
offenders if the consequences of the offenders' activities occur within
their territorial limitsY
4. The fourth common element is that no criminal offense exists
unless the act (or omission) or the consequences of the act, or both
have been forbidden by the sovereign having control of the territory
where they occur.' 0 Privileged acts or privileged consequences cannot
constitute a criminal offense. Somewhere in the chain of cause and
effect stretching between the activities of the offender and their results
51 Bishop, "Criminal Law," Sec. 346-396 (5 Ed. 1872); 1 Wharton, "Criminal Law," Ch. 2 (5 Ed. 1861); 1 Russell on "Crimes," 58 et seq. (7 Ed. 1909);
Harris, "Criminal Law," p. 14-24 (13 Ed. 1919); Roscoe "Criminal Evidence,"
Part II (14 Ed. 1921).
0
Roscoe, Criminal Evidence," 25, 358-9; Harris, "Criminal Law," Ch. 2;
1 Bishop on Criminal Law, Ch. 11; Cf. Levitt, "Origin of Doctrine of Mens
Rea" 17 Ill. Law Rev. 117 (1922), and Levitt, "Extent and Function of the
Doctrine of Mens Rea," 17 Ill. Law Rev. 578 (1923).
7Beale, "Recovery for the Consequences of an Act," 9 Harvard Law Rev.
80 (1895) ; Levitt, "Cause, Legal Cause and Proximate Cause," 21 Michigan L.
Rev. 34, 163 (1922); Beale, "The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 Harvard Law Review, 633 (1920).
8Ibid.
9
For example, when the offense of abortion is deemed to be committed in
the place where the foetus is voided and not in the place where the noxious
drug 0is administered. Edge v. State, 117 Tenn. 405, 99 S. W. 1098.
' in the United States criminal offenses are creations of statutes. In
the'District of Columbia common" law offenses still exist. Tyner v. U. S. 23
App. D. C. 324.
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a prohibited link must occur or the criminal law will not take cognizance of the injury.
5. The fifth common element is that the act or consequence must
injure, threaten, or be likely to injure or threaten, someone whom
society wishes to protect. There can be no criminal offense without
an actual or potential victim.
6. The final two common elements are concerned with the time
when and the place where the other elements exist. An act on the
planet Mars a thousand years ago, or a consequence likely to occur on
Halley's comet, on its thirteenth passing through the orbit of the earth
are of no importance to the present criminal law, although the development of aviation may make them of importance in some future age.
But acts and consequences within the territorial limits of any given
sovereign are of importance to his criminal law; and the time when
they occur may determine what action he will take against those who
caused them. What might have been considered dangerous to society
in one decade may have been found by experience to be harmless. On
the other hand acts considered harmless when done may be of the type
that society wishes to prohibit for the future. Under constitutional
provisions against ex post facto laws past acts cannot be considered as
criminal. The place where an act, or its consequences, occurs may
determine its dangerousness. If a man yells "fire" while in swimming
half a mile from shore, his act will probably be innocuous. But if he'
yells "fire" in a crowded theater he is very likely to start a panic. In
the water the act is harmless; in thie theater the act is criminal. Acts
may take on a criminal character*because of the place where they occur
and the circumstances which surround them. Joining these common
elements together, it would seem accurate to say that a criminal offense
exists when a person produces a forbidden act (omission) or consequence at a time and in a place where someone whom society wishes
to protect is injured or ,threatened with harm.
The existing theories of jurisdiction over criminal offenses emphasize, as we shall indicate later, some or all of these common elements
as being essential before jurisdiction will be exercised. The courts
stress what they call "the gist of the offense." By the "gist of the
offense" they mean those elements of a given crime without which the
existence of that crime cannot be demonstrated. Their primary problem, so far as jurisdiction over criminal offenses is concerned, is to
determine whether the gist of the offense occurred in such a place that
they have the legal power to take cognizance of that offense. The purpose of this article is to indicate the principles which govern the. determination of this problem, and the theories of jurisdiction over crim-
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inal offenses which grow out of the existing constitutional provisions,
statutes and decisions dealing -with this problem.
PRINCIPLES OF JURISDICTION

In a wide sense "jurisdiction" means the power of control which
the sovereign of a given territory has over the persons, property and
institutions within that territory. Subject to such restraints as are
imposed by the law of nations and the legal system which he adopts
the sovereign may do as he pleases within his territory. He may also
delegate his powers to others. He may give them wide or narrow
spheres of activity. Within their spheres the sovereign's agents may
act to the extent which they have power to act. We are concerned
here only with the agent known as the criminal courts, and with the
power they may have to deal with criminal offenses and offenders. For
our purposes the following definition of jurisdiction will be found adequate and accurate: Jurisdiction over criminal offenses means the
power of a given court to inquire into and determine whether or not
an alleged offense has been committed by a designated accused person,"1
and to apply the penalty for an offense so determined. With this
definition in mind certain principles which indicate the extent of jurisdiction which criminal courts have will be noted.
1. The jurisdiction of any court varies with its position in the
hierarchy of tribunals. The lower courts are given jurisdiction within
very narrow limits, while the higher courts have general jurisdictional
capacities. Criminal offenses may be tried in tribunals presided over
by city officials, justices of the peace, police magistrates and special
and general judicial officers. The usual rule is to allow appeals to be
taken from the lower courts in the hierarchy to the highest courts in
the sovereign's territory. 2
2. The jurisdiction of a court may be limited by the characterof
the offense committed. Petty larcenies, breaches of the peace, and
peculiarly local offenses may be tried first in the lower courts. They
would have jurisdiction over such offenses. But offenses of a more
serious nature, like rape, arson, murder, conspiracy, etc., would lie outside of the jurisdiction of the lower courts and would be cognizable
3
only in county, district or state courts.
"Bouvier's Law Dictionary Tit., "Jurisdiction."
U. S. 60 (1916).
2

Cf. Lamar v. U. S., 240

'1General Statutes of Connecticut, Revision of 1918, Ch. 337, is a good example of the usual situation.
"aCode of Criminal Procedure of New York (Gilbert, 1919), part 1.
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3. The character of the penalty to be imposed may delimit the
jurisdiction of the courts. Some of them have jurisdiction to try offenses where the penalty for their commission is a jail sentence or a
small fine, but they do not have jurisdiction to try offenses the penalty
for which is imprisonment in the penitentiary or a fine of considerable
14
proportions or above a designated amount.
4. The territory where the offense was committed limits jurisdiction. City courts have jurisdiction to try offenses committed within
the city limits, but not those committed withirq other parts of the county
in which the municipality is situated. The county courts usually have
jurisdiction over offenses committed within their county, but not those
committed in other counties unless a change of venue has beet secured
in legal fashion, Some courts, however, have jurisdiction over offenses
committed anywhere within the territory belonging to their sovereign.1 5
5. The personality of the sovereign offended limits jurisdiction.
An offense against the laws of the United States is within the jurisdiction of a federal court. Yet it may not be cognizable within a state
court. Offenses against foreign governments may or may not be within
the jurisdiction of local state courts and federal courts.' 6
6. The character of the accused may determine jurisdiction. Certain courts have jurisdiction over juvenile offenders; and others have
jurisdiction over female offenders.17 No courts have jurisdiction over
foreign sovereigns and their personal representatives.'"
7. Statutes of limitation may bar jurisdiction. Courts may have
jurisdiction within the time limits indicated by the statute of limitations
and cease to have it when the indicated time has runP
8. The repeal of a penal statute may oust jurisdiction. Up to the
time when final judgment has been given, the repeal of a statute again'st
which an offense was committed, will deprive the court of power to go
20
on with the trial of the offender.

9. The assumption of jurisdiction by one court may bar another
court from exercising jurisdiction over the same offense. Where jurisdiction over an offense is within the concurrent jurisdiction of two or
14Ibid.
15Ibid.
161

Bishop, "Criminal Law," Bk. 2, sec. 99, et seq.

37Nearly all the states in the United States have domestic relations courts
now. The matter is covered by statutes which differ in the several states.
' 8 Mighell v. Sultan of Jahore, L. R. (1894), Q. B. D. 1, 149.
'92 Russell on "Crimes," 1920, where will be found a table of statutes of
limitations on criminal prosecutions in England.
20 Levitt, "Repeal of a Penal Statute and Its Effect Upon Pending Prosecutions," 9 Journal of the American Bar Assoc. 715 (1923).
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more courts the one first taking jurisdiction may keep it.
courts cannot oust it of its jurisdiction.21
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10. The presence or absence of the offender may determine jurisdiction. The principle is absolute in Anglo-American law that the
accused must be present in court at the time he is being tried.2 2 There
must be control over the person of the accused at time he is being
tried. Subject to the provisions of statutes of limitation it is immaterial when such control was obtained. Nor does it matter how such
control was secured. 3 If the offender was within the territory, within
which the court may function, when he committed the alleged offense,
the court has jurisdiction over the offense. 24 If the offender was without the territory at the time the offense was committed, but he acted
or produced consequences within the territory by means of an agency
or an innocent or guilty agent, who was within the territory at that
time, the courts have jurisdiction.2 5 Jurisdiction in the last case is
predicated upon the rule of "the constructive presence of the offender."261 The rule is based upon three theories. The first is taken
from the law of agency.2 7 The principle qui facit per alium facit per se
is invoked. The act of the agent is deemed to be the act of the offender
and the presence of the agent is construed to be the presence of the
offender. The second theory is that a person is deemed to be constructively present at the place where the force or agency he has employed to perpetrate the offense has operated.28 The third theory is
that if the offender sends into the territory that which is used to consummate the offense, it is as though he were himself bringing the object
used into the territory and remaining there at the time the use of the
29
object he has sent occurs.
If the offender leaves the territory to do that which would be an
offense if done within the territory, and in order to evade the laws of
the territory, he will be deemed to have been within the territory at the
time he committed the offense.30 This principle may be looked upon as
an extension of the rule as to constructive presence of the offender, or
2

'Richardson v. State, 36 Ark. 347 (1892).
Constitutional provisions giving the accused the right of confrontation of
witnesses against him make this principle absolute. Cf. Beale, "Criminal Pleading and
Practice," 240.
23
Matthews v. State, 198 Pac. (Okl.) 112 (1921).
24
Green's Case, 66 Ala. 40 (1880).
25
Reg. v. Barrett, 6 Cox Cr. Cases 260 (1853) ; Queen v. Bull and Schmidt,
1 Cox
2 0 Cr. Cases 281 (1845).
Barkhamstead v. Parsons, 3 Conn. 1 (1819).
27Ibid.
28
State v. Hall, 114 N. C. 909 (1894).
29
State v. Morrow, 18 S. E. 853 (S. C. 1893).
30
Comm. v. Collier, 204 S.W. 74; 181 Ky. 319 (1918) semble.
22
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it may be predicated upon the theory that the sovereign of the territory
will not permit any one to flout his dignity.and law and then return to
li:re iindr their protection. The second commends itself as the more
reasonable, and tHerefore as the better, view.
If the rule as to constructive presence is adopted it means that the
offender, his acts and their consequences are-hauled into the territory
on the back of a fiction, That seems to be a rather heavy burden for a
non-existeice to cairy-. There is- no- need to employ a fiction if a more
rational theory will serve. It is more rational to punish a person who
evades the laws of the place where he lives, whether the evasion be
-by'leaving the territory temporarily for the purpose of doing that which
the laws :forbid, or by doing illegal things in secret, than to punish
him f6r fictitious acts .4ithin.the territory. It must, of course, be admitted- that the courts which adopt this principle are really punishing
a person for-things he has tone outside of their sovereign's territory,
which activities are, tiot necessarily offenses against the laws of the
territory where they occurred.31 There is really an extension of the
penal laws of 'one territory to cover acts done in another territory.
There are, of course, analogous situations. The laws against treason
and counterfeiting are given extraterritorial effect on the grounds of
self-defense' and neessity The same grounds can be urged in the
instant situation.
11. - The citizenship of the affender may limit jurisdiction. All
persons within the territory where the court functions are amenable to
the laws of that. territory whether they are citizens of that territory
or of foreign territories.82 - Jurisdiction will be exercised over such
persons if they offend against the criminal laws:of the territory.
This principle is based upon the needs of self-defense. The laws
of a given territory are made because the needs of the community call
for them. They are protective measures. It would be subversive of
the function of the state within this territory to allow persons to act
in ways harmftil to the community and then claim that the laws do
not apply to them because they are citizens of another country. Sovereignty means control and direction of all things and persons within
the territory of the sovereign. Subjects of other sovereigns are und er
no duty to enter the territory, but if they choose to do so they must
abide by the laws of that territory.
Courts have jurisdiction over citizens of the territorial sovereign
in regard to several offenses, even though the subjects' activities occur
3'Ibid.
321 Russell on "Crimes," 19.
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outside.:of -the- ealin. 33 If a citizen offends against his duty of allegiance it is immaterial where the offense is committed. Treason or
conspiracy against ,the well-being of the sovereign in any way, can
occur anywhere, yet the courts will take jurisdiction over the offender
when he appears within their territories. -Persons committing offenses
on vessels flying the flag of the court's sovereign are within the jurisdiction of the-court no matter where the vessel may have been at the
time the offense Was committed, when such persons come or are
34
brought into -,the territory of the sovereign.
The details of this principle will be worked out later. It is sufficient for our purposes here to indicate that a sovereign will throw the
protection of -hia laws about any of his ships, so long as his law does
not clash with the laws of the sovereign of the territory where the ship
may actually be. So that a person on board a foreign sovereign's ship
cannot set up his- Oxen citizenship as a bar to the functioning of the
sovereign's laws. One sovereign is the equal of another sovereign, but
the" individual subject of a sovefeign is not the equal of another sovereign. This'is definitely showfn by the fact that a foreign sovereign
is nof amenable'to' the'criminal law of the territory where he may be
-while his subject§ ar6, and by the rule'that seamen and passengers on
board ships'are governed by the "law of the flag." The old idea was
that a ship upon thd high seas was "a floating island," and was part of
the territory of the sovereign whose flag was flown. The notion was a
fiction. Islands do not float. They are not ships. The modern rule is
that the sovereign whose *flag the ship flies will inquire into and regulate events and activities which occur on board the ship.
Persons ,who go:to barbarous- countries are deemed "to take their
national law,with -them.' ' 35 -That is,-.whatever they do in those countries
will be crutinized and judged by their national law, which will be
applied to their 'activities, so far as'the application is not unjust when
.the -circumstance and conditions surrounding the activities are con-sidered. Citizenship gives jurisdictiofi in*such cases.
'-Persons who ar citizens 'of no cdfintry' may be subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of all sovereigns. The outstanding example
of this is piracy.36 A pirate is a man without a country. He is deemed
an enemy of all mankind. The courts of any territory where the pirate
is found have jurisdiction over him no matter where his offenses may
have been committed. The position of an expatriated person, however,
33

Reg. v. Lynch (1903) 1 K. B. 744; (1543) 35 Henry VIII, Ch. 12.
Merchant Shipping Act (1894), 57 and 58 Vict., c. 60:1.
3GThe jurisdiction exercised by consular courts under treaties is an example
of this principle in operation.
361 Russell on "Crimes," 257.
34
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is probably like that of all other legally recognized persons within the
territory."
The above principles are generally accepted wherever AngloAmerican law is in force. They present no practical difficulties in the
administration of justice. They all assume that the various elements
of an offense are present within the territory where the court functions. But what of the cases where the elements of an offense are
not all within the territory where the court functions? Suppose that
each of the elements occurs in a different judicial unit: which court
has jurisdiction over the offense? The attempt by legislatures and
courts to answer this question has given rise to various theories of
jurisdiction which will now be considered. For want of better names
the theories may be called (1) The Territorial Commission Theory,
(2) The Territorial Security Theory, (3) The Cosmopolitan Justice
Theory. These theories are not mutually exclusive; nor do they indicate hard and fast boundary lines. They shade into each other by
almost imperceptible degrees and it is difficult at times to know just
where to place a given rule as found in the statutes or decisions. But
they do indicate different methods of dealing with similar sets of facts.
In the following pages the various theories will be discussed with reference to a single question: To what extent does the particular theory
aid in fulfilling the function of the criminal law?
THE TERRITORIAL COMMISSION THEORY

The territorial commission theory of jurisdiction over criminal
offenses is based upon an examination into the location of the offense.
The rule applied is this: Every offender must be prosecuted for his
offense in the place where the offense was committed; and he cannot
be prosecuted in any place where the offense was not committed.
The locus of the offense fixes jurisdiction. Find that and you have
the territory within which the courts have jurisdiction. To find the
locus you must find where the gist of the offense occurred. Wherever
occurs the element of the offense, which the substantive criminal law
calls the gist of the offense, the offense is deemed to occur. The courts
within the territorial unit where the offense occurred are the only courts
that can take jurisdiction over the offense.
The territorial unit has no inherent characteristics. It is any
political division or subdivision which the sovereign may create as a
jurisdictional unit. It may be a borough, city, town, county, state or
country. The usual jurisdictional unit is the county. The territorial
37Otherwise they would be subject to no law whatever, which is practically
unthinkable. See Beale, "Treatise on Conflict of Laws," Part One.
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theory is usually expressed in this way: Jurisdiction over an offense
shall be in the county where the offense was committed. The stateffient
of the theory may vary, but the general notion is that no offense is
judicially cognizable outside of the territory where it was committed.
The history of the theory is somewhat different in England and the
United States.
FOUNDATIONS OF TERRITORIAL COMMISSION THEORY

There are two foundations for the territorial theory in England.
The first is an historical one and the second is a metaphysical one.
A.

The Historical Foundation.
The historical foundation consists of three elements. These are
(i) the survival of primitive religious idea, (ii) notions of community
responsibility for the activities of a member of the community, and
(iii) early methods of procedure, by the community,' against the individual offender.
(i) Religious Ideas. Primitive religious ideas are static. They
are rooted in fear and held with a tenacity which is commensurable
only with the instinct of self-preservation. They grow out of man's
inability to understand the physical forces which surround him and
his desire to placate those forces which he feels are inimical to him.
In the earliest forms of religions, fetichism, totemism and animism, the
habitations of divine beings (be they spirits, goblins, demons, jinni,
gods) are sacred places and thus tabu. They must not be defiled nor
desecrated. The gods must not be insulted or annoyed. Human
activities which are normally harmless and proper if done outside the
sacred places become offenses against the gods, and thus are likely to
call down their wrath upon the actor, if they are done in the sacred
grove, on the banks of a sacred stream, upon a mountain top, or within
a temple. Homicide, thieving, rape, trickery, and the violation of the
rules of hospitality are not looked upon with displeasure by primitive
communities. They are the normal methods of self-preservation. But
homicide committed within a sacred grove is sacrilege; stealing from a
worshipper in a temple of the gods is impiety. They are offenses
against the gods who will punish such acts. It is the place where the
deed is done which makes the deed an offense. If the deed was done
within the territory where the deity lived, or over which he had extended
his protection (in the later development of religious ideas) the doer
was amenable to the wrath of the outraged deity. But if the deed
occurred outside such territory the deity was not concerned in the
matter. Pan did not avenge wrongs done to Neptune; and, although
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Zeus had supreme authority over all of Greece, still Appolo had concurrent jurisdiction over acts done within the Temple of Music. The
motto was: Every god to his own bailiwick!
All of the tribes and nations which contributed to and developed
into the English people had this notion of the territorial jurisdiction of
the gods. They incorporated their religious idea into their legal codes.
The transference of the idea to the common law was simple and
natural.
Comnmnity Responsibility for Offenders: The gods of
(ii)
ancient peoples were tribal gods. They protected and punished their
own. Offenses against them by those within their jurisdiction called
forth not only punishment of the individual offender, but also punishrhent of the offender's family and even the entire tribe. If the tribe
or the community shielded the offender, knowingly or unknowingly,
the wrath of the.god was visited upon the entire group. They were
under a duty to avenge the insult to their god. To placate the deity
or to avert his wrath they must find the offender and punish him. The
community and not the individual was held responsible.
This idea is also carried over into primitive and early legal systems. All the systems which contributed to the common law had this
idea. The family of an offender had to pay bot, wer and wite for
him. The Hundred had-to track-an offender through its territory and
-show that he was-not within it if it-wanted to be free from imputation
of -guilt by reason of his activities. Later on offenses against the king
called forth punishment- against the town or borough of which the
offender was, an inhabitant unless the offender was punished or delivered up to the-king. But a community was not accountable for
events outside of -its territory by persons not a member of the community. The territorial group was accountable for its own members;
it was not responsible for the deeds of a member of another territorial
group. The jurisdiction of the group was delimited by the territorial
area which it inhabited. Nottingham paid no attention to what occurred in Gloucester ; and the courts in Sussex did not inquire into
-happenings in Northumberland. The judicial functionin.g of the territorial unit ceases .at its boundary lines.
(iii)
Trial of the Offender. When an offense was committed
within a given territorial area the entire community took cognizance of
that offense. The individual had to justify, or make compensation for,
his actions to the social group of which he was a part. The liistor.y of
the development of .the, methods of procedure in Anglo-Saxon law and
in earliest common law times is outside the province of this article.
All with which we are here concerned is the fact that the method of
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trial by jury did develop.' It is upon this institution that the territorial
theory is mostly founded.
Trial by jury meant that the offender was brought before members
of his own community who were to decide whether-he was guilty of
'the' alleged 6ffense and if so to what extent. The jurymen were originally the' witneses, They had to testify to what had occurred. Their
testimony iusf be based fupon their own knowledge. They were practically eye and ear witnesses: The elements of the offense 'occurred in
their presence. They saw the acts of the alleged offender; they heard
the cries of the victim., they were present when the thief was caught
or the stealing occurred or the homicide was committed. These things
occurred within their community. They were members of the community. They lived in the vicinage of the crime. What they knew the
community knew; what they decided the community decided. Trial by
jury was a community trial. The witnesses were community-men.
When the character of the jurors changed from witnesses to triers
of testimony, the community nature of the trial remained. That which
the jurors decided to be the facts, was acted upon by the community
which the.jurors represented in an inquisitional capacity. The inquisitorial range of the jury was limited to the territorial area inhabited by
the community. It was for this reason that the dead body of the victim
of a homicide had to be before the jury if the jury was to adjudge an
alleged offender to be a murderer. If the body of the victim was in
ahiothr eoufty'the jury did not have all the facts before it. They could
not s'9y, that the man was dead. They did not know. They had to view
the Victim before they would know. They could not see over a bound,ary line., Wh~atever happened outside of the territorial area of their
community did not exist for them. Community-responsibility ceased at
the bbundary line ;'.and. wh'ere responsibility ceased jurisdiction ceased.
When, in the course'of time, the territorial unit called the county,
became'the judicial unit which was to take cognizance of offenses, tle
jury.bcamd a counti jury: Venue and jurisdiction were-the same.
Juries drawn from t'he 'oiufty decided what was to occur in regaral to
off~ises committed- 'ithin the county. The theo-y worked both ways.
Infiabitantg. from tone county could .not try "cases in 'another county.
-They could-not represent the community which'wai responsible. Offenses.dn one cbunty' -culd not be tried in another county. A conlmunify' wis'not 'res ofisible Jor what occurred in another, community.
All the elements of i criminal -offense-,had 'to be within the'te1ritorial
area of 'the community'before the coi'iunity wbuld fake responsibility
for the offehse and inquire intb it. This was the general iule which
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-had grown up and of an amalgamation of primitive religious ideas and
community responsibility for individual activities.
B.

The Metaphysical Foundation.
The territorial theory of jurisdiction had another foundation in
the metaphysical notion which later grew into the doctrine that one
sovereign will not enforce the penal laws of another sovereign. The
notion was-that the overlord had a dignity which was not to be flouted
within his domain. Whatever occurred within his domain concerned
him and his honor. He made the laws which were to govern his
domain. They were to be obeyed within. Offenders against his laws
were amenable to him. He was supreme-within his domain. But outside of his territory he was without legal power. Another territory had
another over-lord who was supreme within it. He would enforce his
laws within his domain. But neither one was concerned about enforcing the laws which the other one had promulgated. Each over-lord
looked after his own domain and let the domain of another overlord
severely alone unless he felt str'ong enough to back up his meddling
with armed forces.
As an over-lord extended his domains he extended the jurisdiction
of his laws. The development of the king's peace is an excellent example. It began with the theory that brawling must not occur, even
between the most powerful princes, within the precincts of the king's
house. With the extension and growth of the king's political power,
backed as it always was by the physical power of the king's armies, the
king's peace was extended to his forests, whether they were adjacent
to his castle or in places where the king rarely or ever visited, and then
to the highways which he built, or traveled, or declared to be under
his protection, and then to various and sundry places, towns, churches,
and the domains of those whom he especially took under his protection. Finally the king's peace extended over the entire kingdom under
his control; the king's law held sway over his dominions; and the king's
will was enforced throughout the territory which belonged to him. But
at no time did the king, any more than did his subordinate princes and
over-lords, concern himself with enforcing the laws of another king
who ruled over another territory. He was not worrying himself about
maintaining the dignity of the other man. But he would brook no
indignity to himself. His honor must be kept clear at all costs.
When you add to the theory of the personal dignity of the king the
ecclesiastical idea that the king rules by divine right and as the temporal
representative of omnipotent deity you emphasize once more the primitive religious notions of the community. For once again it becomes
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impious to interfere with the king's will; it is sacrilege to offend against
the laws; evil doing in his domain is tabu. "Such divinity doth hedge
a king" that it sanctifies his territorial domains. The king and his lands
are one. His laws represent the divine will. He who flouts them
offends against heaven. All who are within his domains are subject to
his will; he must protect them from harm. He will redress injuries
and do justice between man and man. It was the establishment of thisidea which made it possible for the territorial security theory of jurisdiction over offenses to emerge when the theory of county jurisdiction
was found to be totally inadequate for the protection of the king's
subjects."8
C. Federal Law.
In the United States the territorial theory is the predominant one
in both the federal law and the laws of the several states.
In the federal lav the theory is based upon constitutional provisions. Article Three of the Constitution provided that an offender was
entitled to a jury trial in the state where he committed the offense with
which he was charged. The Sixth Amendment modified this and gave
jurisdiction to the courts of the judicial district within which the offense
was committed, provided that the district had been created prior to the
commission of the offense. If the district was created after the offense
was committed the proper place for trial was in the previously existing
district or state. The district must be created by congress and not by
the courts for their own convenience.
The above provisions relate only to offenses committed within a
state or judicial district. If they are committed outside of a state or
judicial district the offender may be tried wherever "Congress may by
law direct." If the 6ffense is a capital offense the offender must be
tried "within the county where the offense was committed, where that
can be done without great inconvenience."3 1
These provisions mark an attempt to adapt the common law territorial theory to conditions in the United States. The federal government had no territory of its own excepting the small section given by
Maryland and Virginia as a site for the national capital. There were
38
The writer is keenly aware of the fact that such broad historical generalizations as are enunciated in the immediately foregoing paragraphs should be
buttressed with authoritative references. But the material is entirely too voluminous for presentation in this article. The reader is referred to Muller, "Sacred
Books of the East," Frazer, "The Golden Bough," Spencer and Gillan's writings
on the Australian aborigines and the other recognized authorities in anthropology and ethnology. At some future time, Dei volenti, the writer purposes to
bring out parf of a more pretentious work on criminal law in which the details
which39 are here missing will be fully set out.
Act of March 3, c. 231, 1911; 36 Stat. 1087, par. 40.
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no counties of the United States. Independent states were the only
territorial units in existence, outside of the District of Columbia. They
were, therefore, the only judicial districts at first created and recognized. 40 Later on when some districts were divided into divisions for
practical reasoni the county idea was reverted to and offenders triable
in the divisionwhere they committed their offenses. The provision in
regard to capital offenses is a complete throwback to the common law
idea of county jurisdiction over offenses. On the other hand the power
of congress to fix the jurisdiction over offenses committed outside of
any state is the natural result of the legal non-existence of the several
states so far as international relations are concerned. The authority
of each state reached to its boundary lines and no farther. Offenses
might be committed on the high seas, or in foreign countries (treason,
for example), or within the District of Columbia, or within any territory which the nation might acquire after the adoption of the federal
Constitution. Such offenses ought to be cognizable somewhere. Thd
several states had no jurisdiction. Only the United States had jurisdiction if any existed, and Congress was the legislative body to indicate
where the jurisdiction should be exercised. It followed, therefore, that
if congress did not indicate where the offender was to be tried, and no
judicial district had jurisdiction, an offender could not be tried anywhere by the federal courts.
Just so soon as territories were added to the domain of the United
States the territorial commission theory- was applied, to-them, and when
territories were made into states the territorial commission theory of
the state wvas ubstituted for the federal territorial commission theory.
D.

Jurisdiction aid Venue., -

it is-to,- be noted that a distinction was clearly made between
jurisdiction over offenses and the common law notion of venue. Venue
deals with the place, from which the jury -is'to be summoned. Jurisdiction deals with the place where the trial is- to 'occur. At common law
the jury rwas summoned from the- county within which the trial was
to be held; but in-our federal- procedure the .jury could be summoned
4
from any part of the judicial district in which the offender was triedAs a district might, and in most cases does, include an entire state, the
, offender might be tried in orie county and the jurors come from all the
other countiesin the state.42 The accused -had no right to be'tried by
a jury from, any particular county, -rot' even fh'e county in which he
401 Staites'at'Larkg 7
41

42

(798).
1
Cleme,1t v. U. S.- 149 Fed. 305, (1906) _ .Spencer v. U. S.69 Fed. '6Z (1909):
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committed the offense. Even when a district is divided into divisions,
the jurors may be summoned from any part of the district.43 So long
as the jurors come from the district the constitutional requirements are
met. The entire matter rests within the discretion of the trial court.
It can designate certain localities within the district as being the places
from which the jurors shall be called; or it can order that jurors from
certain localities shall not be called. This discretion is limited only by
the requirement that an impartial, fair and intelligent jury should be
impaneled. If this is done, the accused cannot be heard to complain. 44
It should also be observed that if the offense was not committed
within a judicial district it could not be taken cognizance of in that
district unless Congress had expressly directed such action. 45 That is,
the territorial commission theory is strictly applied in both its affirmative and negative aspects.
E.

Law -of tHe Several States.

The strict territorial commission theory of jurisdiction over criminal offenses is also the predominant theory in the laws of the several
states of the United States. It is found to govern most of the offenses
which can be committed against the laws of each state. An offender
must be tried in the county where he commits the offense, unless he
calls for a change of venue, for good and sufficient reasons, or, in some
states, unless the state calls for a change of venue because a fair trial
cannot be had in the county where the offense was committed.
The theory was taken over in toto from the common law which
was in force at the time our nation was founded. The general idea
is that the common law rules were to apply as far as they reasonably
could. Only one state, Maryland, 45a has made this idea explicit in its
constitution, so far as trial by jury is concerned. In many states con-,
stitutional provisions as to trial by jury have been interpreted to mean
trial by jury as it was known at common law,- and thus a trial in the
county where the offense was committed ' 6 That is, the political unit
431bid.
44U. S. v. Ayers, 46 Fed. 651 (1891); U. S. v. Standard Oil Co., 170 Fed.

988 (1909).
45

Neeley v. Henkel, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 302 (1901) ; Vernon v. U. S., 146 Fed.
121 (1906); U. S. v. Richards, 149 Fed. 443 (1906); Cf. U. S. v. Sutherlqnd,

214 Fed. 320 (1914).

45aDeclaration of Rights, Art. 21 and Art. 5.
46
People v. Povell, 87 Calif. 348; 25 Pacific 481 (1891), is an example of

this. The constitutional provisions- of the several'states are not all uniform.
Fifteen kinds of phrasing is employed, as the following table shows ,

I. The accused is entitled 'to a "speedy public trial' by an impartial jury."
No mention of the' county or district in which the trial niust take
place is made. lFourteen states have this provision.

They are Cali-

fornia, Connecticut, Delaivare, Georgia, 'Idaho, Iowa, Michigan,
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of the county was held to be the jurisdictional unit in criminal trials.
This jurisdictional unit cannot be enlarged by the courts, according to
decisions in some states, and in one state the constitutional prohibition
seems to prohibit the legislature from enlarging it. In Louisiana a
recent change in the constitution gives the legislature some slight
leeway in enlarging the jurisdictional unit for prosecutions of criminal
offenses.
The result is that the courts have been mostly concerned with trying to find out just where the offense was committed, before they could
determine questions of jurisdiction. In homicide, f~r example, it has

II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.

IX.

X.

XI.
.XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.

Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, Texas.
The accused must be tried in "the county where the offense was cornmitted." Seven states-Florida, Indiana, Mississippi, Oregon, South
Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee.
The accused shall be prosecuted in "the county or district" in which the
offense has been committed. One state-Alabama:
The accused shall be tried in "the county or district where the offense
was committed, which shall prev:ously have been ascertained by
law." Three states-Arkansas, Minnesota and Wisconsin.
Offenses shall be tried "in the county in which the offense is alleged to
have been committed." Four states-Arizona, Colorado, Illinois,
Washington.
The accused shall be tried in the "county or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed." Eight states-Kansas, Montana,
Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Wyoming.
Prosecutions are to be held in the "county where the alleged offense
was committed." One state-West Virginia.
In Louisiana the constitution provides that "all trials shall take place
in the parish in which the offense was committed, unless the venue
be changed, provided further that the legislature may provide for
the venue and prosecution of offenses committed within one hundred
feet of the boundary line of a parish."
In 'Massachusetts the Bill of Rights declares that "in criminal prosecutions the verification of the facts in the vicinity where they happen
is one of the greatest securities of life, liberty and lroperty of the
citizen."
The constitution of New Hampshire provides that "in criminal prosecutions the trial of facts in the vicinity where they happen is so essential tO the security of life, liberty and estate of the citizen, that no
crime or offense ought to be tried in any other county than that in
which it was committed, except in cases of general insurrection in
any particular county, when it shall appear to the judges of the
superior court than an impartial trial cannot be had in the county where
the offense may be committed, and, upon their report the legislature
shall thing proper to direct the trial in the nearest county in which
an impartial trial can be obtained."
In Missouri the accused is entitled to a "speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county."
The accused is entitled to a "speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the vicinage." Three states-Pennsylvania, Virginia, Kentucky.
The constitution of Vermont provides for "a speedy, impartial trial by
an impartial jury of the county."
In Maine the accused is entitled to a trial before "a jury of the vicinity."
The constitution of Maryland provides for a jury trial in accordance with
the common law of England if that law "is found -applicable."
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been held that the delivery of the mortal stroke or other cause of the
death is the element of the offense which fixes the jurisdiction of the
courts.4 7

The statutes of many of the states read in such a way as to

justify such a holding. On the other hand, some courts have decided
that the death of the victim is the gist of the offense, and that the trial
of the offender must occur in the county where the death occurred.
There are statutes which make such decisions tenable.4 7 a In regard
to the crime of abortion, there is a square division of opinion. It has
been held that the offense is committed in the place where the instruments or drugs which are to produce the abortion are used4 8 ; and also
that the abortion occurs where the foetus is discharged. The first
holding is reached by looking at the place where the effective, causal
agencies are utilized. The second holding is reached by looking at the
place where the consequence occurred. Another example is found in
prosecution for failing to support one's family. Is the offense committed where the delinquent father or husband resides or where the
wife and children become dependent? The courts have gone both ways.
Some look at the place where the cause of the omission was4sa, and
others look at the place where the consequences of the omission become
manifest. 4 b And Louisiana has gone so far as to say that even though

both omission and its consequences occur within the same state, and, by
logical inference, within the same county the offense is not perpetrated
unless the accused knew of the presence within the state, if not within
4
the county, of the victims who felt the results of his omissions. 9
F. Defects of Territorial Comnission Theory.
1. These examples indicate the outstanding defect of the strict
territorial commission theory. Unless offender's or victim's acts and
consequences are all within the spatial limits of the territory, be it
county, state or nation, the courts are driven to artificial analysis and
reasoning. They must either make use of fictions, as they do in regard
to larceny, or else they must stress one of several, or many, elements in
a criminal offense and ignore the others, as they, do in homicide or
abortion. Life cannot be encompassed by imaginary lines. Human
events ignore metaphysical entities. Criminals are not always obliging
enough to confine their activities completely to the limits of territorial
sub-divisions. Libels are circulated in many counties and poisoned
447 Greenfs Case, 66 Ala. 40 (1880).
7aWisconsin Statutes of 1921, section 4679, is an example.
48
4 Comm. v. Bengaman, 51 Pa. Ct. 336 (1912).
SaPoindexter v. State, 137 Tenn. 386 (1917).
4sbState v. Peebles, 99 S. E. 813 (1919).
49
State v. Clark, 80 Sou. 778 (1919).
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candy is sent~from California to New Jersey. Criminal offenses may
extend ov;ar- C6hinent by reason of the agencies which are used, consequefnces which are produced, and persons who may act. The modern
world is a spread-out world. The modern-criminal is a diffusive animal. You cannot protect the modern world from the modern criminal
by setting up arbitrary limits t6 places where he can be punished. On
the contrary, the criminal is aided and encouraged in committing his
offenses because he knows that in most instances he will not be punished for his offenses if he stays away from the place where he committed them. All he needs to do is to step over a boundary line and
he can thumb his nose at those who pursue him. Rendition or extradition proceedings may be started, to be sure, but by that time the
criminal may have committed another offense and have stepped across
another boundary line to a new haven.
2. Another defect in the territorial commission theory of jurisdiction as applied to counties, at least, is its utter artificiality. There is
no relation between the size of the county and the protection to be
afforded to the county from criminal offenses; nor to the protection
afforded the criminal when he is placed on trial. For example: At
the place where New Jersey, New York and Pennsylvania meet, a criminal can stand in A county, New York, shoot across the entire width of
B county, at that point, in New Jersey, and kill a man in C county in
Pennsylvania. No matter how large C county is, its size does not protect it; nor is it protected by the entire extent of B county. Imaginary
lines are non-existent protection. Furthermore, Rhode Island has
four counties and Connecticut twice that many. Yet both states can
be put very comfortably into one county in Texas. And see the result.
An offense committed in a county in the northern part of Rhode Island
cannot be punished in the southeastern county in Connecticut, yet if
the offense is committed in the northeastern part of Pecos county,
Texas, where Rhode Island would be if placed in Texas, it could be
punished in the southwestern part of Pecos county, where Connecticut
would be if it could be placed there alongside of Rhode Island. If
the offender committed an offense in Providence county, Rhode Island,
the jury would come from. a distance of .not ,more than thirty miles
from the scene of the offense. - If he committed, an offense in Pecos
county, Texas, the jury to try him might come from as far as one hundred and fifty miles from the place where the crime was committed.
The Rhode Island offender would be just as likely to get an impartial
jury from Connecticut as the Pecos county offender would be to get
one from the other end of that county.
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Counties are not laid out with any regard for' the punishment of
criminal offenders. Political considerations are paramount when a
state is divided into counties. Sometimes the natural configuration of
the terrain is utilized. 'Rivers, mountains arid lakes may be made a
boundary line between cotinties. But even such things are ignored
when partisan politics run high. The famous "shoe-string" district
in Pennsylvania and Tom Green county in Texas show what is likely
to happen when counties are laid out. Usually a state is laid out into
as many equal subdivisions as- possible, and each division is called a
county: To insist that criminal offenders should be tried only in the
county where the offense is committed because that happened to be
the rule' five hundred years ago in England is nothing less than stupidity. Conditions are different now from what they were then, even
in England. New times call for new protective measures. If an old
rule fails to fulfill its function it should be abolished.
G.

Transition to TerritorialSecurity Theory.

Offenses on Boundary Linqs. Indeed the strict territorial commission theory has been departed from since very early times in regard to
offenses committed on a boundary line. In such cases it is very likely
that the offense might have been committed on either side of the line,
and so in either county. The doubt is resolved in favor of the state
and against the offender and the rule is that offenses committed on a
boundary line are triable in the county on either side of the line. The
same rule applies where the exact location of the boundary line is
uncertain or unknown.
These exceptions to the strict territorial theory mark the beginning
of a transition from.the strict territorial commission theory to the territorial security theory 9f jurisdiction over criminal offenses.
For when once it was allowed that an offense committed in one
county codd be prosecuted in the adjacent county because the position
of the boundary line was indeterminate, it was easy to raise this question: How far within the territory of one ,county may an offense be
committed .and -still.be within the jurisdiction of an adjacent county?
This question has been answered in various ways. ,
1. Some courts have insisted that no variation from the strict
rule can be permitted. It is argued that if the legislature can indicate
that territory fifty. feet from a boundary line and in one county should
be within the criminal jurisdiction of an adjacent county, it could-also
indicate that crimes committed within one, three or fifty miles from
the boundary line should be within the criminal jurisdiction of an ad-
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jacent county. This would be absolutely contrary to the rights of the
accused to have a trial in the county where he committed the offense.
Hence statutes which give jurisdiction to adjacent counties when
offenses have been committed within specified distances of the boundary
line are held to be unconstitutional and void.
2. Other courts take the position that such legislation is not unconstitutional even when the strict territorial theory is applied. They
argue that the creation of judicial districts is within the power of the
legislature. They can be extended or contracted as the legislature
wills. When the legislature states that offenses committed within fifty
feet of a boundary line may be tried in either of the adjacent counties
they are creating a judicial district one hundred feet wide and as long
as the boundary is long. Over this judicial district the courts of the
adjacent counties are given concurrent jurisdiction. Analogies to this
are found in the rule that offenses committed on boundaries which are
highways may be tried in either county, and that states may give each
other concurrent jurisdiction over offenses committed anywhere on a
river which separates them from each other. That is, the courts argue,
in fact, that the political subdivision of the territory of the state need
not-be the only jurisdictional unit.
The jurisdictional unit may be composed of territory lying within
two or more political units.
In Colorado,5 " when one county is attached to another for judicial
purposes, offenses which are committed in one county may be prosecuted in either county. In Connecticut 5' offenses committed on any
"waters adjacent to a town but not wholly within it" are held to be
done within the town, and so may be prosecuted in the town courts.
52
The most striking instance of this theory is found in Minnesota,
where the route of a railroad is made into a judicial district and
offenses committed on trains may be punished in any county into or
through which the trains run.
3. Another theory is that the statute which gives concurrent jurisdiction to courts of adjacent counties over offenses committed within
designated distances of the boundary line, is that the legislature has
extended the territory of each county for the designated distance into
the territory of the other county so far as criminal prosecutions are
concerned. The strip of territory on either side of the boundary line
belongs to both counties. It is a joint, or community, ownership.
Therefore the courts of each have jurisdiction over it.
5OMills Annotated Statutes, 1912, section 2099.
5t
52Statutes, 1918, section 6567.
General Statutes, 1913, sections 8506, 9151, 9152.
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Result. Whichever theory is accepted, the fact remains that nearly
all of the states allow for the prosecution of offenses committed near
a boundary line in either of the adjacent counties. The distance from
the boundary line within which the offense must be committed varies
from fifty feet to eight hundred, rods. The usual distance is five hundred years. The acceptance of this rule by so many of the states
marks a step away from the strict territorial theory and the beginning
of the general security theory.
Offenses in Two Cozrts. Another step in the same direction is the
rule allowing for the prosecution in either county of offenses which
were committed partly in one county and partly in another county. The
reason why this rule was adopted is, probably, that many offenders
escaped punishment because it could not be shown that the offense
with which they were charged had been committed in the county where
they were tried. If an offense is committed only in part in a county
it cannot be said that it was committed wholly therein, unless indeed
the part which was committed was the gist of the offense. It often.
happened that the gist of the offense was not committed in the county
where the offender was tried and he would escape punishment even
though he had killed a man or burned a barn. Another reason is that
the courts began to see that an offense consists of several elements.
Causes have effects, acts have consequences. The cause may occur in
one place and the consequence in another. The offense may begin in
one county and be consummated in another. It took the parts to make
the whole, but if there was no punishment for the part performance
of a crime, nor for all the part performances if they occurred in separate counties, there would be no punishment for the entire offense, and
thus no protection to the community against repetitions of the offense
or part of the offense.
To meet this situation two theories are adopted and followed.
The first is that a part of the offense will be considered as the
whole of the offense, whether such part is the gist of the offense or not.
The second is that the place where a part of a crime occurs will be
considered as the place where the whole of the crime occurred. The
second theory is the one more generally adopted.

II-THE TERRITORIAL SECURITY THEORY
In the preceding section the writer indicated that the earlier theory
of jurisdiction over criminal offenses was the territorial commission
theory. According to that theory the matter of primary importance is
the determination of the place where the offense was committeed. The
rule is that every offender must be prosecuted in the place where the
offense was committed and could not be prosecuted in any other place.
It is the locus of the offense which fixes the jurisdiction of the courts
over the offense and the offender. To determine where the locus was you
had to determine where the "gist of the offense" had occurred. By "gist
of the offense" is meant that element of the offense without which
it cannot be said that a crime has been committed. The courts within
the territorial unit where the gist of the offense occurred are the only
courts which have jurisdiction over the offense. The territorial unit
has no inherent characteristics. It may be a borough, town, city,
county, state or country. As a result of historical development the
usual territorial unit for purposes of jurisdiction over crimes is the
county. The territorial commission theory is usually expressed by saying that jurisdiction over an offense shall be in the county in which
the offense was committed. The statement of the theory may vary, but
the fundamental idea is that a crime is judicially cognizable only within
the territory in which it was committed. The courts were more interested in a theory of sovereignty than in the control of one who had
manifested anti-social tendencies. The crime and not the criminal was
the center of attention.
THE

TERRITORIAL SECURITY TiEORY

With the passage of time it was seen that the strict territorial commission theory of jurisdiction over criminal offenses was inadequate to
meet the needs of the communities which made up the nation. Offenses
were committed on or near the boundaries between counties or judicial
districts and it tvas impossible to prove that they had been committed
in one or the other of the counties. Or offenses were committed partly
in one and partly in another county and it could not be said with legal
exactness that the entire offense had been committed in any one county.
Or, offenders would commit crimes in one county and hasten away to
another county and never return to the county within which they had
committed the offense. Injuries could be done to persons and property
with practical impunity. The law was flouted because it was not feared.
It was not feared because it could not be enforced.
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Soon, however, it was seen how stupid it was to allow the general
security of life and property to be impaired because of a theory of territorial jurisdiction. To allow an offender to escape punishment because
he acted upon one side rather than on another side of an imaginary line
was seen to be useless, particularly when taken in connection with the
idea that the sovereign's law existed on both sides of the line. Then
it was realized that it was most important to get control of the offender
no matter where he might be within the realm of the sovereign. Having broken the laws in one part of the realm, he was likely to break
them in another part. It was not the place where they were broken, but
the fact that they had been broken, which was of primary concern. The
offender must be taken into custody wherever he could be found if the
safety of property and persons was to be assured.
A.

ENGLISi

LAW.

In England the general security theory was established, first, by
a fiction, then by a theory of the continuity of an offense, and finally by
definite statutory fiat. It was thus made possible to take control of a
person who was a menace to the general security not only in the place
where he committed his offense, but also in any place where he might
be found to be in custody.
1. The Fiction. The fiction arose in connection with the crime of
larceny.' It was early held at common law that if a person stole goods
in one county and carried them into another county, he committed a
new theft in the county into which he brought the stolen goods. The
fiction was patent. It was impossible for the offender to steal from
the victim that which the victim no longer possessed. Nor can the
fiction be rationalized by means of the idea that the possessor of stolen
goods is under a duty to return them to the owner. If the duty does
exist, then it could be argued that the failure to return amounted to
keeping the goods out of possession of the true owner and so it was
practically the same as taking the goods from him. The omission had
the same result as an act of taking would have had. But failure to
return stolen goods to the owner was not a crime at common law,
although a civil action would lie, and a civil wrong could not be made
the basis for a criminal prosecution.
2. Theory of Continuing Offense. The theory of a continuing
offense appears to have two aspects. The first is connected with lar73 Const. 113; 1 Hale, P. C. 507; 2 Hale, P. C. 163.; 1 Hawkins P. C. c.
33 s. 52; 4 Black. Com. 304; 2 East P. C. 771.
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ceny. 2 If the same kind of commodity, like illuminating gas, is stolen
in a series of takings, but by means of the same instrument, it is not
necessary as a matter of pleading for the prosecuting witness to elect
which of the particular takings is to be the basis for the prosecution.
He may just indicate what the instrumentality used in the stealing was
and within what time limits the thefts occurred. The courts seem to
think that the continued existence of the instrumentality, such as a
pipe attached to a gas main at one end and to the gas pipes within the
house-at the other end, is enough to make the offense of stealing of gas
for illuminating purposes, although, the house is illuminated only at certain times of the day, a continuing offense. If the gas main was in
one county and the house was in another county the continuing offense
of stealing the gas would seemingly be held to occur in the county where
the house was, although the larceny of the gas could only occur in the
county where the gas main was.
The second aspect seems to depend upon the fact that the court
focuses its attention upon the consequences of the act of the 'offender
and looks to see where they occurred. An example of this is what
the courts call continuing false pretenses. 3 If A induces B by false
pretenses to build and deliver to A a van, and B does so, A is guilty
of obtaining goods by false pretenses even th6ugh the goods were not
in being at the time of the pretenses and A has cancelled the order
prior to the delivery of the van. The building and delivery were induced by the false pretenses made by A; therefore, the offense continues from the time of the making of the pretenses until the time
when the goods are delivered.
It appears to the writer that there is no need for this theory so
far as the offense of obtaiiiing goods by false pretenses is concerned.
The gist of this offense is the obtaining. The time which elapses between the making of the pretenses and the receipt of the goods is immatrial. That the goods were not in esse at the time the pretenses
were made is also immaterial. That the false pretnse continues is true
only as it is true that every fact once created continues, in the sense
that it cannot be undone, and it is immaterial whether it continues or
not. The pretense may be completely wiped out after it has been
made, yet if the goods were obtained by reliance upon it, the crime is
committed.
2

R. v. Firth, L. R. 1 C. C. R: 172 (1869).
3R. v. Martin, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 56 (1867),
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Another example is that of inducing a girl to leave her home in
one country and come to another for immoral purposes. 4 Where the
girl was induced to leave Scotland and come to England, the court
held that although the inducement occurred in Scotland the offense
was a continuing one in England and therefore England had jurisdiction over the offense.
It is difficult to sustain this case in reason unless one frankly admits that the gist of the offense consists of the consequences resulting
from the inducement. And indeed that is what the purpose of the law
governing the offense is. It wishes to prevent the use of women for
immoral purposes. It is not concerned simply with the enticing of the
women from their homes. Other statutes deal with that offense. To
say that the inducing continues into England is hardly reasonable. To
say that if persons help to produce immoral relations between men
and women in England they shall be punished in England for their
activities seems sensible. The court is really looking at the offender
and the consequences of his activities. It is not really concerned with
the spatial position of the act of inducing. If it were and then applied
the strict territorial commission theory it would have to say that the
offense had been committed in Scotland and therefore the English court
had no jurisdiction over the offense.
3. Statutory Jurisdiction. The statutes giving jurisdiction to the
courts of the places where the offender may be found or apprehended
as well as where the offense was committed do not cover all the penal
offenses, but only a small percentage of them.
These are the offenses of forgery, uttering forked matter, bigamy,
perjury, subornation of perjury, larceny and murder and manslaughter
by a British subject on land outside of the United Kingdom, the plundering of wrecks, interfering with salvaging operations, offenses committed on a journey and breaking jail. The same theory is behind
statutes giving jurisdiction to all of the counties on or near the boundaries of which offenses were committed, or within which offenses
were partly committed. Examples of offenses covered by such statutes are conspiracy, the uttering of counterfeit money, and jurisdiction
over accessories.
B.

FEDERAL LAW.

In the United States the general security theory is found implicitly
in constitutional and statutory provisions. If an offense is committed
outside of a state or district, Congress may indicate where the offender
4

R. v. McKenzie, 27 T. L. R. 152 (1911).
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may be tried. Congress may act according to its discretion in response
to the needs of the nation. Acting in accordance with its power, Congress, in various paragraphs in the judicial and penal codes and in
statutes dealing with some specific offenses, has given the federal courts
jurisdiction over various offenses no matter where they may have been
committed. The federal courts have also developed this theory in
applying the doctrine of a "continuous offense" to criminal conspiracy.
C.

LAw IN THE SEVERAL STATES.

1. Offenses on Public Carriers. In the several states statutes are
common which provide that offenses which are committed on railroad
trains or water-craft during a trip or voyage, may be prosecuted in any
county into or through which the train or craft-may come in the course
of the voyage or trip, or in the county in which the voyage or trip may
terminate. The strict territorial commission theory cannot be applied
because it is often impossible to ascertain in which county the offense
was committed. If the offense is larceny, it can usually only be shown
that the goods were aboard the train in a certain county and were then
found in the possession of the accused in another county. just where
the appropriation occurred is beyond proof.
So far as larceny is concerned, of course, the fiction that every
asportation is a new taking might be applied. But that fiction has not
been extended to offenses other than larceny. The theory of a continuing offense cannot be applied because it is not known where the offense
commenced.
From a purely analytical position it is obvious that the offense
was committed in some county along the route traversed by the train
or ship. It might have occurred in any county. Therefore, to make
assurance doubly sure, all counties along the route are given jurisdiction
over the offense.
Furthermore, such a rule gives greater protection to the traveling
public than the strict territorial commission theory. Modern life entails
a great deal of traveling about for social, political and commercial
reasons. Means of transportation should be made safe from aggressors. People who are compelled, or desire, to travel about should be
as secure as they would be if they remained in one locality. The legal
system is meant to protect people within the state no matter where
they are. The law broods over the railroad as well as over the farmhouse. One who commits an offense while on a public conveyance
should be punished wherever he may be caught or found as well as
in the place where the offense occurs.

-
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Maryland allows the most sweeping jurisdiction in regard to
the crime of disorderly conduct if committed on a public conveyance.
The offender may be tried and punished practically anywhere within
the state.5 Idaho does the same thing in regard to persons stealing
rides." Maine, for offenses upon tide waters, allows considerable lee7
way of jurisdiction.
The Maryland rule as to disorderly conduct should be extended
offenses which can be committed in moving vehicles. In these
all
to
days of common use of high-power automobiles, offenses of all kinds
can be, and are, committed while travelling over the ground at a great
rate of speed. County, state and national boundary lines mean nothing.
Offenses may be begun in one county, continued in other and consummated in another state or country.
The same thing applies to aeroplanes. They are being used more
and more for commercial purposes. Passenger service is regular and
schedulized. They differ, so far as criminal offenses are concerned,
from railroads and water-craft only in that the medium through which
they travel is the air and not the water or land. As the rights of the
state extend ad caelun, its duty to protect should be co-extensive.
2. Transitory Crimes. A number of crimeg are considered as
transitory because of their nature.
(a) The earliest transitory crime, was, probably, larceny. The
common law fiction gave way to the statutory enactment that he who
stole could be prosecuted for larceny in any county into or through
which the property was brought or where it was possessed. This rule
was extended, in the course of time, to the offenses of robbery, burglary, embezzlement and receiving stolen goods. Massachusetts 8 applies
the same rule to the offense of obtaining goods by false pretenses.
It is to be regretted that occasionally a court will see fit to adhere
to the fiction connected with larceny and declare that the rule cannot
apply to the crime of burglary, for that can be committed but once, as
the essence of it is the breaking and entry and this can occur only
where the place broken into and entered is situated. The purpose
of the rule is to give more protection to property by permitting the
punishment of the offender wherever he can be found. Modern conditions call for the rule, and a too meticulous application of an antiGMaryland Statutes, sec. 102.
6
Compiled Stats., 1919, sec. 8445.
7
Statutes, 1916, ch. 133, sec. 4.
8
General Laws, 1921, sec. 59.
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quated fiction and an outworn theory of jurisdiction is hardly in keeping with the needs of the time.
(b) Some offenses against the person are transitory. The abduction, decoying and enticing of children may be punished in the
county where the offense is commited or where the victim may have
been taken or brought. The same rule applies to procuring, in any
way, females for purposes of prostitution, concubinage or other immoral purposes. Practically all states have statutes embodying this
rule of jurisdiction.
Some courts say that the offenses are continuing ones. Others
say that the offense is partly committed in every county where the victim is taken. But whatever the theories of the court may be, the
obvious fact is that the purpose of the statutes is to apprehend the
offender wherever anything connected, in almost any way, with the
offense was done or produced. The legislators are not focusing their
attention so exclusively upon the place where the offense was committed, but are beginning to pay some attention to the offender himself.
He looms up as a more important factor than heretofore in determining jurisdiction over his offenses.
(c) Bigany, Polygamy and Incest. This is more clearly shown by
the rule governing the offenses of bigamy, incest and, in Maine, polygamy. These offenses may be prosecuted in the county where they occur, where the offender resides, or where he is apprehended. Here
definitely the territorial commission theory, if not abandoned, has been
added to in order to secure greater protection from offenders. This is
shown by the rule as applied to incest. For incest can be committed
only in the place where the incestuous intercourse occurs. It cannot
be a continuing offense, although incestuous cohabitation, which does
not appear to be forbidden anywhere by statute, may be. Yet, nearly
all of the states which forbid incest allow the offender to be punished
in the county where he is apprehended as well as where the offense is
committed. This is explicable only on the theory that the statute is
aimed at the offender and not at the offense alone. The idea seems
to be that a person who is guilty of incest is too much of a menace
to be at large anywhere. He must be punished wherever you can get
him. The last mentioned theory would also apply to persons guilty of
bigamy and polygamy.
The rule as applied to these latter offenses, however, may be the
outcome of the desire to combine two theories which resultd in opposite holdings in the state where the strict territorial commission
theory was followed. Some of these courts have held that the offense
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was committed at the place where the unlawful marriage ceremony occurred. Others have held that the offense'was committed in the place
where the illegal cohabitation took place. All of them have put their
attention on the place where the offense occured and seem to have overlooked the fact that the word "marriage" is sometimes interpreted to
mean the marriage cerenwny and sometimes the marriage status. If
bigamy means a second ceremony, the offense is committed at the place
where the ceremony was performed. If bigamy means cohabiting, as if
a legal entrance had been made into the marriage status, the offense is
committed wherever the parties live together, or whevever they hold
themselves out as being married. If the first meaning is adopted, then
the crime is really an offense against the laws dealing with the capacity
to go through a valid marriage ceremony, for a married- person cannot
be a party to a valid marriage ceremony. It is in its essence an illegal
attempt to enter into the marriage status. The strict territorial commission theory would give jurisdiction over the offense to the county
where the attempt occurred. If, however, the second meaning is
adopted, then the object of the statutes prohibiting bigamy is to protect a social institution, and the result of violating the statute is that
the stability of the social institution is threatened. The menace exists
wherever the person illegally holding himself out to be within the
status may be. Even under the strict territorial commission theory the
offense would be a continuous one. It would be within the jurisdiction
of any county where the offender would reside or be found. Combining these two theories we get the rule as laid down, more or less
generally, throughout the United States.
(d) Bastardy Proceedings. In bastardy proceedings the putative
father may be prosecuted in the place where the act of begetting is
charged or where he resides (according to the rule in New Hampshire),9 or where the child is born, even though the begetting was in
another county or outside the state (according to the Pennsylvania
rule) .10

The purpose of bastardy statutes is to aid in preventing the birth
of illegitimate children. The New Hampshire rule looks to the offender.
It wants to get him wherever he may be. The Pennsylvania rule looks
to the consequences of the offender's acts. Punish him wherever the
consequential birth occurs. Both rules are for the purpose of protecting some incidents of the social institution of marriage. The New
Hampshire rule is, probably, more efficacious than the Pennsylvania
OPublic
Statutes, 1901, ch. 87, sec. 1.
' 0Statutes of 1920, sec. 7866.
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rule. A combination of them would be better than either one alone
to carry out the purpose of the statutes.
(e)
Libel. Libel and the sending of criminal letters through the
mail are transitory in many states. They may be punished where
the libellous matter is printed, published, circulated, mailed or received.
The purpose seems to be to protect the victim wherever possible injury
may come to him and to punish the offender wherever the results of
his activities become manifest.
(f) Rape. The Texas statute as to rape' is a definite expression
of the territorial security theory. The person who commits rape can be
punished where the nearest judge resides. Some respect is paid to the
territorial commission theory, because the place where the offense occurred is used as the point from which to measure toward the nearest
judge. But it is most obvious that county lines, or boundaries of
judicial districts, must not interfere with the punishment of offenders.
(g)
Conspiracy in Texas. A further step is taken in regard to
conspiracy. A conspirator who enters into a conspiracy outside of the
state to do an illegal things within the state may be punished in the
county where the offense was to have been committed (although nothing has as yet been done there, apparently) or in any county where he
may be found, or in the county where the seat of government is located.lla
No doubt an overt act would have to occur somewhere within the
state to complete the offense, but it seems as though just the likelihood
that harm would come within the state gives jurisdiction over the offense. 'The provision that the prosecution may occur in the county
where the seat of government is located indicates that as the function
of the government is to protect the inhabitants of the state it should
have the privilege of dealing with those who threaten the security of
the state in the place where the state governmental agencies and officials are situated.
(h)
Cruelty to Animals. Maine has an unique statute which deals
with cruelty to animals.'
It provides that one who is accused of being
cruel to an animal may be prosecuted in any county where the animal
may lie found. Jurisdiction is fixed, apparently, by the spatial position
of the victim. In this respect the statute is like the statutes which
permit a homicide to be prosecuted in the county where the victim dies.
But a difference can be taken in this way. The homicide statutes are
"'Revised Criminal Statutes, 1920, sec. 254.
laSee note 17 infra.
"2Statutes, 1916, sec. 66, cb. 126.
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concerned with the results of the offenders' acts. But the Maine statute
seems not concerned with the results of the cruelty, but with the place
where the victim is.
It may be, of course, that the presence of an abused animal in a
community is an affront to the moral sensitivities of that community,
that the one who was cruel to the animal in that far contributed to the
affront, that the statute is designed to protect the general security of
the moral sentiments of all communities, and that the offender really
produced results in the community where the animal is and so should be
prosecuted there.
(i) Prize-Fighting. The statutes, found in many states, which
forbid prize-fighting and give jurisdiction over it to the counties into
or through which the offenders may pass,, or be, or are apprehended,
are also designed to protect the social interest in the peace and morals
of the state.
(j) Law Enforcement. Some offenses are transitory because
they interfere with the enforcement of the law, even though no particular individual may be injured.
(1) Escape. Breaking out of jail or escaping from prison are,
in many states, punishable in any county in the state. In these cases
no particular individual is injured, but the entire law is flouted. An
escaped convict is, or may be, a menace to every community in the
state. Every community is given the authority to protect itself from
the presence of such a menace. The general security of the state is
furthered by such a rule.
(2) Lynching. The crime of lynching is another example. The
rule in Indiana 13 is that lynching is a continuous crime from the moment of its inception to the moment of its consummation, and that anyone connected in any way, in any county of the state, with the mob
that does the lynching, may be prosecuted in the county where he contributed to the lynching as though the lynching had occurred in the
county wheie the contribution was made.
It is true that when a lynching occurs, an individual is the victim
and suffers hurt through it, but the purpose of the statute primarily is
not so much to punish the mob for the death of the victim, as to punish
it for taking the law into its own hands, and interfering with the
proper administration of justice. The offense is against the due process of law. The law exists throughout the state. An offense against
it extends throughout the state and may be prosecuted anywhere within
the state.
13

Burn's Annot. Indiana Statutes, sec. 1874.
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( k) Treason. The rule as to treason is of the same character.
It can be punished anywhere in the state, because it aims at the existence of the entire state and defensive measures against it are properly
allowed anywhere within the state. The general security of the whole
is threatened. Any part of the whole may protect the whole from a
general danger.
(1) Counterfeiting. Another example is the Texas rule as to
counterfeiting. 14 The offense may be prosecuted where the counterfeit
coin is made, where it is passed or attempted to be passed. The general security of all commercial relations is based upon a valid and
legal medium of exchange. The existence of counterfeit coin threatens the security of business dealings throughout the state, for modern
business is not confined to local political units, and what is an economic
danger to the entire state calls forth preventive measures throughout
the state. The Texas rules as to perjury and false swearing, though not
so sweeping as the above, are of the same character. The general security of commercial and legal transactions must be protected throughout
the state.
It is to be observed and noted that the attention of legislators is
being focused less and less upon the place where a criminal offense it
committed and more and more upon the place where the offender can
be apprehended. The realization is growing that not the crime but
the criminal is the most important factor to be considered in the protection of society. The presence of the offender and not the locus of
the offense is coming more and more to be the determinant of jurisdiction over criminal offenses. Although at the present time only a few
offenses are considered to be transitory, it may confidently be expected
that an increase in their number will be made in the near future as
the criminal law becomes more responsive to the needs of modern
civilization.
NATIONAL SECURITY.

The preceding examples of the application of the general security
theory of jurisdiction over criminal offenses have been concerned with
the protection of the'individual members of the state or nation. But
the theory is also applied so as to protect the state or nation as a
whole.
1. Protection of Administrative Agencies. In the first place this
is done so as to protect the administrative agencies of the government.
'4Revised Criminal Stats., sec. 258.
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These agencies are the army, the navy, the customs department, the
excise department, the post office department, and any other departments which are necessary for the proper administration of the functions -of government.
England. In England, offenses committed by officials of the crown
outside of the realm, and acts of aggression aimed at the security of
the state, like treason and the betrayal of official secrets, are within
the jurisdiction of any court which gets physical control of the offender.
The offender can be prosecuted where he committed the offense, or
where he is apprehended, or where he is in custody, or where his
activities resulted in an interference with the proper functioning of an
administrative agency.
United States. In the United States whoever interferes with the
working of the revenue and post office departments can be prosecuted
where he acted, or where he caused consequences to occur, or where the
lives or where he can be found.
2. Protection of National Honor and Dignity. In the second
place, the general security theory is applied so as to protect the honor
and dignity of the sovereign of the state or nation. This application is
an outcome and development of the metaphysical basis of the strict
territorial commission theory of jurisdiction..
Sovereigns. When the sovereign of one domain visited or passed
through the domains of another sovereign he commanded such respect
as his power and prestige procured for him. He had no legislative
powers within the domain of another, but he was exempt from the
operation of the laws of that domain. If the visiting sovereign offended
against the laws of his host, redress came through an appeal to force.
The offending sovereign could be expelled, imprisoned or killed. But
these were warlike measures. The offender was outside the legal
control of his host.
Representatives of Sovereigns. With the continued development
of relations between sovereigns, those who represented the sovereigns
began to receive the same honors and courtesies as the sovereign would
have received had he been present himself. "The King Ambassadors"
were the king. So, too, were the lesser officials of the sovereign when
on official business and when provided with official credentials. These
credentials were of many kinds: rings, signets, tokens, livery, colors,
standards and flags. Wherever the credentials were displayed, they
indicated that the accrediting sovereign protected the persons and places
that displayed them.
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Commercial Protection. With the development of commerce and
trade it became customary for merchants to place themselves under the
protection of some powerful person,. so that they and their property
would be free from assaults and dangers in whatever regions they might
travel. Those who asked for protection gave tribute or allegiance.
They were subjected to the rules which their protector laid down for
their guidance and control. Letters patent, charters, and "such like are
examples of the way in which protection was overtly established.
Law of the Flag. In maritime commerce the flag became the symbol of the protecting sovoreign. "The law of the flag" means that
rules and regulations established by the sovereign whose flag is flown
will govern all activities on the ship over which the flag flies. The flag
will protect all those who are upon the ship.
The corrolary of protection is submission. Submission may be
express or tacit. To remain in a place over which protection was extended by a sovereign is a tacit submission to it. To enter into a place
where a sovereign's protection existed is an express submission to it.
Once a person comes within the sphere of protection he enters into the
sphere of submission, which the protecting sovereign creates and indicates. Activities within the protected sphere are subject to the laws
which are operative within that sphere. Offenses against those laws
are offenses against the protecting sovereign. They may be prosecuted
wherever the law of that sovereign operates. For this reason, activities
on ships are subject to the "law of the flag" no matter where the ships
may be. Offenders against that law can be prosecuted wherever the
sovereign wishes to prosecute within his own domain. The theory is:
Whom the law protects it can punish. Admiralty jurisdiction is based
on this theory. So, too, is the jurisdiction exercised by the criminal
courts over offenses committed outside the territorial domains of the
sovereign, but within his sphere of .protection, by subjects and nonsubjects alike.
The converse of this theory is also true- Whom the law does not
protect it will not punish.. This is amply demonstrated by the facts
that offenses committed, against foreign laws, in foreign territories
and on foreign ships in foreign waters are almost entirely outside the
jurisdiction of the courts.
Bases for Jurisdiction. The territorial security theory of jurisdiction operates with reference to several factors in a criminal offense.
The offender owed a duty of compliance with the sovereign's law which
he breached. The victim was entitled to protection and did not receive
it. The prestige of the sovereign is impaired to some extent because
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of his failure to protect the victim. The acts and consequences or
either of them occurred within the sphere of protection and so were
amenable to the laws operative within the sphere of protection. This
application of the theory, therefore, utilizes some of the notions of the
territorial commission theory of jurisdiction as well as those of territorial security theory. Ships are something like territory in that they
are physical objects with definite dimensions and boundaries, and also
because they can become part of a territory by incorporation. Then,
too, persons who entrust themselves, and objects which are entrusted,
to instruments of commerce must be kept secure, or commercial and
trade relations will suffer and, perhaps, be destroyed. When a sovereign states that certain ships and territories are his, he asserts that he
will protect all those who enter upon them with his permission. He
guarantees, practically, that there will be no breaking down of his
legal system and his governmental functioning, and that the security
of the individual will be maintained. The individual is assured that he
can rely upon the protection of the sovereign wherever the law of the
sovereign is held out to be in force. He who puts his trust in the sovereign will not find his trust betrayed. Anything, therefore, which interferes with the maintenance of this protection is an injury to the dignity
and prestige of the protection-promising sovereign and must be prevented. To aid in such prevention, jurisdiction over offenses is given,
in England, to the admiralty courts and the Central Criminal Court,
and, in the United States, to the federal courts.
3. Comity between Nations. In the third place, the general security theory is applied so as to maintain friendly relations between states
and natiorfs.
Extradition and Interstate Rendition. Extradition treaties are
examples of this; so are the provisions in the constitution of the United
States making interstate rendition obligatory upon the several states
of the Union.
Affirmatively stated the principle is that jurisdiction will be assumed over a person who has committed an offense against domestic
or foreign laws either at home or abroad if such action will foster and
maintain friendly relations with a foreign sovereign.
Offenders
against foreign laws in foreign territory who come to this country will
be handed over to the offended sovereign according to the terms of the
extradition treaty made with him. Otherwise the territory of one sovereign may become an asylum for those who break the laws of another
sovereign. This might lead to resentment on the part of the latter and
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induce him to engage in reprisals which may bring on-a war. It is
better policy to surrender those who have violated the laws of a foreign
sovereign to him than to protect them against him. Reciprocal active
assistance in the enforcement of territorial sovereignty is better than
mutual passive resistance to the punishment of the law breakers.
Neighborly protection is better than neighboring danger.
On the other hand, if the assumption of jurisdiction over a foreign
subject, or foreign sovereigns, will cause a rupture of friendly relations with other countries jurisdiction will not be exercised. It is for
this reason that sovereigns and their representatives are exempt from
the application of the penal laws of any foreign territory where they
may be. No nation will imprison or otherwise punish -visiting sovereigns or their official representatives unless the needs of self-defense are
so imperative that they outweigh the desire for peace and the evils of
war.
4. Creating a Forum. In the fourth place, the theory has been
applied by the United States Supreme Court to provide a forum for
the trial of offenses against the laws of the United States, when Congress has not done so. This was done in the case of United States v.
Bowman, which was decided in 1922.15
The principle laid down in that case was this: If a statute creates
an offense but does not indicate the place where the offense shall be
tried, you can find that place by looking at the nature of the offense
and determining its purpose and scope. If the offense can be committed only within certain territorial limits, the courts of that territory
only can have jurisdiction. But if the offense can be committed anywhere, and is committed outside of any territorial limits of .the United
States, the federal courts will have jurisdiction over the offense no
matter where it was committed. If the purpose of the statute was to
protect a given locality within the territory of the United States, the
courts of that locality should take jurisdiction over the offense. But
if the purpose of the statute was to protect the nation taken as a whole,
every federal court can take jurisdiction over the offense and the courts
of the district in which the offense is first found or brought has jurisdition over the offense. Necessity overrides all theories of jurisdiction
which interfere with national self-preservation.
This theory indicates an attempt to carry out, albeit in a very
conservative and limited way, the function of the criminal law; i. e.,
the protection of society from actual or potential evils no matter where
those evils may appear. It looks to the consequences of activities and
15260 U. S. 94; 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 39 (1922).
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not to the activities themselves. If the consequences of activities include harm to the nation, the actor will be amenable to the national
jurisdiction. The spatial position of the actor at the time he acts, the
spatial position of his acts or instrumentalities and the existence of
foreign control over the territory wherein the activities of the actor
occur are all immaterial. The nation is the victim. That is enough to
confer jurisdiction on the nation's courts.
Federal Penal Code. The instant case was decided under section
35 of the federal penal code. The principle it enunciates, however, applies to many other sections of the penal code. Chapter 1 deals with
offenses against the existence of the government. Sections 1 to 5, inclusive, would be governed by the instant case. Chapter 4 deals with
offenses against the operation of the government. The principle case
would apply to sections 27 to 30, inclusive; sections 32 to 44, inclusive;
sections 60, 61 and 63; sections 66 and 67; sections 70 to 79, inclusive,
and section 82. Chapter seven deals with offenses against the currency
and the coinage of the United States. The following sections would
come within the principle case: sections 148 to 154, inclusive; sections
162 to 169, inclusive, and section 178. Certain sectiofils of the chapter
are expressly excluded from the operation of the principle cause because they refer to persons "within the United States or any place subject to the jurisdiction thereof" and thus invoke the strict territorial
theory of jurisdiction. Sections 156 to 161 come within the exclusion.
So do sections 170 and 171.
It is to be regretted that Mr. Chief Justice Taft saw fit to make
a distinction between injuries to the United States and injuries to
individual citizens or inhabitants of the United States. It is submitted
with all due deference, that the function of the criminal law is not
only to aid in protecting the state as a juristic person, but also to aid
in protecting the individuals who compose the state, and that this function is only partially fulfilled if theories of jurisdiction prevent the
protection of the individuals within a given territory.
For example, Mr. Chief Justice Taft excludes the crime of murder
from the operation of the principle he enunciated. But surely the murder of a subject is an "obstruction" of the government if only for
the reason that a potential fighter and protector is destroyed.
And, again, the distinction between public and private injuries
leads to difficulties, needless difficulties, it is submitted, in dealing with
offenses against public justice as treated in chapter 6 of the federal
penal code. Section 126 will illustrate this point. .It reads: "Whoever shall procure another to commit any perjury is guilty of suborna-
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tion of perjury . . . etc." Suppose that a subject of the United
States while in South America, there hires a person to come to the
United States and testify falsely in a civil suit between private persons which is pending in New York City. The person does so testify.
Is the perjury directed against the government in that it interferes with
the administration of justice, or is it directed against the rights of
the private persons who are parties to the civil suit? It is submitted
that it is both; that the destruction of private rights is an interference
with function of the government whose duty it is to protect the individual members of the nation. And the same reasoning holds true of
the offense like embezzlement, fraud, arson and burglary. The theory
of the principle case should be extended to cover injuries to individuals
as well as injuries to the state as a juristic person. This, however, has
not yet been done.
TRANSITION TO COSMOPOLITAN THEORY OF JURISDICTION OVER CRIMES.

Finally, it is to be noted that there are provisions in the penal codes
of several of the states of the United States which mark, rather definitely, the beginning of a transition from the territorial security theory
of jurisdiction over criminal offenses to a theory -of jurisdiction based
upon cosmopolitan justice.
This transition is very well illustrated by the provisions in the
Penal Code of New York and in similar provisions in the criminal
law of a number of states which have followed New York in the
codification of their laws. An analysis of the New York Code will
represent, in practically every point, an analysis of similar provisions
in the laws of these other states as well.
1. Penal Code of New York. The Penal Code of New York, in
Article 174, sections 1930 and 1933, deals with the persons who will
be punished for the commission of criminal offenses. Five situations
are presented. Each will be discussed in turn.
(i)
If a person commits within the state any crime, in whole or
in part, he may be punished within the state. The local jurisdiction
would be in any county in which the offense was committed, partly
committed or consummated. This provision may be subsumed under
the strict territorial theory or the general security theory of jurisdiction. The offense is committed within the state; the acts of consequences are dangerous to the state, and the offender must be punished
where the offense was committed or the consequences are felt.
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(ii) The second situation presented is that of a person outside
of the state getting some one else to commit a crime within the state.
The language used is: "A person who being without the state causes,
procures, aids or abets another to commit a crime within the state."
This provision can be brought under the strict territorial theory of
jurisdiction only by the use of principle of agency law qui facit per
aliamn facit per se, or the notion that the person punished is constructively present within the state when the offense is committed. Each of
these is fictitious. Punishment for crimes cannot be evaded by pleading the relation of principle and agent. It is physically impossible for
a person to be inside the state at the time that he is outside of it.
The Code is really concerned with trying to prevent the commission of
crimes within the state by the use of agencies and instrumentalities of
various kinds, on the part of persons who are physically outside of
the state and who, therefore, cannot be reached by a strict territorial
theory of jurisdiction. The general security theory is really being
adopted. If the consequences occur within the state, and these consequences are harmful, the ohe that brings the consequences about will
be punished, as principle of accessory. But the offense must be committed within the state. Offenses committed outside of the state are
not within the purview of this provision.
(iii) But the third situation provided against deals definitely with
offenses committed outside of the state. Three crimes are mentioned.
These are larceny, abduction and kidnapping.
If an offense is committed outside of the state which would be
the offense of larceny if done inside of the state and the offender i
found in the state with any of the feloniously appropriated property,
he will be punished for larceny. The provision represents, of course,
the codification of the common law rule governing larceny. Only the
fiction that every new asportation is a new taking is definitely aban-.
doned. But the common law rule has not been taken over in tota.
It has been modified. The felonious taking need not be a larceny in
the place where it occurred. It must be an offense against the law of
that place. But it can be "any offense," although it must be that which
would be larceny by the law of New York had the offense really occurred therein.
It is obvious, of course, that New York does not desire to become
a dumping ground for mis-appropriated goods, nor a haven for those
who offend against the property laws of another state. It may be that
the purpose of the law is to keep thieves out of the state. But it may
also be that New York does not wish to have within its limits any of
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the consequences growing out of the commission of an offense in
another state.
The provision dealing with abduction and kidnapping would give
added weight to this last idea. For if the person who is guilty of the
crime of abduction or kidnapping "brings, sends or conveys" the victim into New York, he may be punished for kidnapping or abduction.
Here it is to be noted that the offense is made out if the offender is
guilty of a crime according to the law of the foreign state. The activity of the offender does not need to be contra the abduction or kidnapping laws of New York. His punishment is based upon the fact that
the victim was introduced into the state. New York does not want to
harbor abducted or kidnapped persons. Such consequences of criminal
activities abroad it tries to prevent. Nor will it matter that the victim
is most innocent or harmless. The law is not directed against the victim
but against the offender. The offender must keep his victims and
himself out of New York. The. general security may be threatened by
the presence of the victims, for some of them may be dangerous to New
York, but the general security is threatened by the presence of the
offender. If he kidnaps a person in another state, he is likely to try
and kidnap a persot in this state. So that -if he ever comes into the
state he will be punished. His offense consists of two parts: abducting
or kidnapping a person in another state and being connected with the
introduction of the victims into this state. The law of the foreign
state is broken by the first factor. The law of New York is broken
by the two factors. But punishment is not yet meted out simply for
offenses against the laws of a foreign state.
- (iv)
The fourth situation presented deals flatly with acts done
outside the state which produce illegal consequences within the state.
The language is "A person who, being out of the state, and with intent
to cause within it a result contrary to the laws of this state does an
act which in its natural and usual source results in an act or effect contrary to its laws.' The legality or illegality of the act outside of the
state is immaterial. An innocent or guilty act, plus inens reca, plus
illegal results within the state gives the basis for punishment by this
state. Harmful result within the state is all that is required. The rest
may occur outside the state.
(v) But the provision dealing with the fifth situation stresses the
act which is done outside of the state, and makes the act punishable
because of its injurious effects within the state. Section 1933 says
that "a person who commits an act without this state which affects persons or property within this state, or the public health, morals or de-
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cency of this state, and which if committed within this state would be
a. crime, is punishable as if the act were committed within this state."
This section applies even when the act done outside of the state is legal
where done. In it New York is saying to the rest of the world that if
anything is done outside of New York which could not legally be done
inside of New York, and injury results to persons, property, health,
morals or decency in New York, the actor will be punished if he ever
comes into New York.
This is the territorial security theory of jurisdiction pushed to its
logical limit. Whatever hurts the community will be punished no matter where the activities occur which produce the hurt. All that is required is a showing that the foreign activities would have been forbidden in New York and had harmful results in New York, and punishment will be inflicted in New York. But it is also the beginning of
cosmopolitan justice. Activities abroad may be criminal by foreign
law and may be criminal if done in New York. Activities abroad may
affect persons, property, health, morals and decency in New York.
This would be always a matter of fact. But if the connection between
criminal activities abroad (which would have been criminal activities
in New York, had they occured there) and harmful effects in New
York is .made out, then New York would punish. offenses committed
abroad because of the consequences occurring in New York. That the
consequences are harmful to New York does not alter the fact that the
activities are crimes abroad. New York will punish foreign offenses
when they affect her citizens. Modern life is so complex, modern states
are so inter-connected and inter-related, that whatever occurs in one
state has potentialities for good and evil in all the other states. All
foreign crimes are potentially affective in New York. All foreign'
crimes are potentially punishable in New York. What is true of New
York is true of all the states which"have adopted, practically, the New
York code.
It is a far cry from the strict territorial theory of the Common
Law to the provisions we just have been considering. The next step
will be to punish those who commit crimes abroad, even if the effects
of the crimes are not definitely felt at home, other than that the presence of one who has committed a crime abroad may be looked upon
as being an injury, actual or potential, to the state where he may go
after he has committed the crime abroad. Indeed, one wonders if the
step has not already been partly taken when one considers some of the
statutes found in the several states. The following examples will indicate the existent provisions.
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Texas. The Texas code of criminal procedure provides that
"prosecutions for offenses committed wholly or in part without, and
made punishable by law within, this state may be commenced and carried on in any county in which the offender is found." 16 Two things
are to be noted. The presence of the offender gives the locus of the
jurisdiction, and the offense may be entirely committed outside of the
state. So long as the offender has done outside of the state that which
he could not legally have done within the state, and then comes into state
he is amenable to punishment in any county where he may be. The
statute as to conspiracy, in Texas also, provides that "when the conspiracy is entered into in another state, territory or county, to commit
an offense in this state, the offense (of conspiracy) may be prosecuted
in the county where such offense (the crime to be committed) was
agreed to be committed, or in any county where any one of the conspirators may be found, or in the county where the seat of government
is located."'7 Here the crime is committed outside of the state and
the presence of the offender is the only thing which gives jurisdiction
to the courts of the state. 'That the peace and dignity of the state was
threatened seems, to be enough to make the offenders amenable to punishment.
There is also a section dealing with offenses committed by state
officials outside of the state. It provides that "offenses committed
out of this state by a commissioner of deeds, or other officer acting
under the authority of this state, may be prosecuted in any county of
this state."'$
It is not quite clear just what this statute means. It
may mean that the officers of the state will be punished for doing that
which is a crime according to Texas law. In that case the statute must
be deemed to have ex-territorial force, and follows the official whereever he may go. Or it may mean that Texas will consider itself so
outraged when one of its officials -ommits an offense against the laws
of another state that they will punish the official as though he had
committed a like offense within the state. The dignity of the state
must not be impaired by representatives of the state. If it is impaired
the representatives will be punished. Here again it is to be noticed that
though the real offense is committed in another state, the official position
of the offender is the basis for the prosecution..
Other States. In many states there are provisions in the statutes
permitting the prosecution of persons who leave the state to do that
which is forbidden to be done within the state. The statutes usually
U-Sec. 237, Rev. Criminal Statutes.
17 Sec. 253, Revised Criminal Statutes.
' 8 Revised Cr. Statutes, sec. 249.
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refer to duelling and prize-fighting, but liquor-selling and betting, have,
by judicial construction, been treated is like manner. They can be
explained only on the ground the states which have such laws will not
tolerate having in their territory persons who will claim the protection
of such of the laws as they like, and then step across a boundary to/
avoid the duty of obeying the laws they do not like, and then return
for further protection.
Massachusetts has a statute' 9 which purports to give jurisdiction
over offenses committed on the "sea" withiri a marine league of the
shore, to the county adjacent to the water on which the offense was
committed. This statute appears to be the only one of its kind.
Whether a state may exercise concurrent jurisdiction with the United
States over offenses committed on the marginal seas may be open to
some question. But be that as it may, it is interesting to find such a
statute, because it definitely purports to take cognizance of offenses
committed outside of the state's territory, and to punish the offenders
committing them. How the statute would be interpreted is a matter
of pure conjecure, as no case has been found connected with it. But
its phrasing is quite sweeping. It may mean that Massachusetts courts
are to. take cognizance of offenses against the Law of Nations, against
the laws of the several nations as well a against the laws of Massachusetts. Or it may mean simply that Massachusetts law extends a
marine league out from shore. The latter is the more likely meaning.
The statutes dealing with jurisdiction over offenses committed on
the St. Francis and Mississippi Rivers are the most interesting of all
those dealt with in this section. According to these statutes all offenses
committed on the St. Francis River, where it is a boundary line between Arkansas and Missouri, may be prosecuted in either state; and
all offenses committed on the Mississippi River, where it is a boundary
line between Arkansas, Mississippi, Missouri, and Tennessee, may be
prosecuted in the states which are separated by it. 2 0 Each state will
take cognizance, of course, of offenses against its own laws only. But,.
none the less, two complete systems of law are in force at the same
time on the rivers. Tennessee law is enforced in Missouri; Arkansas
law is enforced in Tennessee. The penal code of one state operates
in another state. It is not true, so far as these states are concerned, that
jurisdiction stops as the boundary line of the state.
[To be concluded in the next number.-Ed.]
1SLaws,
1921, sec. 57.
20
Statutes of Arkansas, 1921, secs. 2857, 2858; Acts of Missouri, 1911, p.
202; Laws of Mississippi, 1910, ch. 141; Tennessee Code, 1917, secs. 80a-1.

